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On Biotechnology, Theology, and the Human Sciences
Jonathan Jong 
 
 
Abstract 
There may be very good Christian theological reasons to oppose human biotechnological enhancement. 
It is, however, difficult to discern what they are. Much of the specifically Christian response to transhu-
manist biotechnological enhancement has revolved around the metaphysics of human persons; this is 
hardly surprising, given that similar themes appear in other bioethical themes, such as over in vitro fer-
tilisation, abortion, and euthanasia. The main aim of this paper is to clarify the theological requirements 
for such responses, particularly those that are mistakenly delegated to scientists. In particular, the paper 
will focus on the need for a Christian theological account of human nature that does not unduly rely on 
biological accounts of the same.   
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It will not have escaped the attentions of readers of this journal that conversation between “science” 
and “religion” is typically asymmetrical, such that theologians are often reacting to the empirical and 
theoretical deliverances of the sciences broadly construed. We are eager to elucidate the theological im-
plications of this or that scientific discovery, sometimes keen to ward off so-called debunking argu-
ments and other times keen to build on findings we consider germane to our theological commitments. 
In this eagerness, we may have ceded too much ground to the scientist, delegating metaphysical work 
to her. Meanwhile, the positivistic dismissal of philosophical and theological metaphysics is alive and 
well among public-facing scientists1. So, the metaphysical work has largely been left undone, but this is 
not to say that we are not—in our scientific, philosophical, and theological construction—nevertheless 
guided by metaphysical presuppositions: quite to the contrary, we have just uncritically adopted scien-
tific ontologies in our philosophizing and theologizing. The disastrous effects of this move are wide-
spread, not least in the field’s decades long and surprisingly expensive preoccupation with the discovery 
of causal joints between God and nature, as if both occupy the same secondary efficient causal space. 
More to the point on this occasion, however, is the way in which theological objections against biotech-
nological enhancement are undermined by our own reticence to do Christian theological metaphysics.  
None of this is to deny the importance of attending to empirical facts. Indeed, our situation is 
exacerbated when we simultaneously delegate our metaphysical work to scientists while also predicating 
our technological dystopianism on speculative ignorance on scientific and historical matters. For exam-
ple, no sensible discussion about biotechnological enhancement can be had without the honest recogni-
tion that we are all already beneficiaries of enhancement technologies. Let us begin here, then, with the 
flogging of a dead Luddite.
 
How humans have changed 
Cognitive abilities are changing. The “Flynn Effect” refers to the observation that IQ scores have been 
rising over time, since the 1930s, when standardized intelligence testing was first widely administered 
around the industrialized world. A recent meta-analysis found an average increase of 2.31 standardized 
IQ points per decade. The effect was robust across different samples, performance levels, and methods 
of measurement.2 The effect has also been documented in developing countries, where the IQ gains 
over time are now more rapid than they are in industrialized countries.3 We can have debates over 
whether standardized intelligence tests like Stanford-Binet, Weschler, or Ravens tests really measure in-
telligence until we are blue in the face, but if these changes over time are not merely statistical artifacts 
or the result of test-taking practice, then there is some sense in which cognitive abilities have changed 
over recent generations: my generation’s average IQ is nearly one standard deviation higher than that of 
my grandparents’. Given that it is vanishingly unlikely that these IQ gains are the result of evolution by 
natural selection over the past century or so, changes in our social, economic, and cultural environ-
ments are probably responsible for this enhancement.   
 Longevity is changing. There is little evidence for changes in the maximum human lifespan, but 
this limit applies to so few individuals that it is more distracting than meaningful. Average life expec-
tancy from birth has certainly increased markedly over time, but this too is an uninformative metric, 
telling us more about infant mortality than we might want to know. More importantly, not only has in-
fant mortality declined, but those of us who survive childhood do live longer now than our ancestors 
did, though this journey towards longevity has been bumpy. Most of the pre-modern data available are 
of wealthy or otherwise privileged men; no surprises there. For example, J. D. Montagu mined the Ox-
ford Classical Dictionary for birth and death dates of prominent ancient Greek and Latin male figures (phi-
losophers, poets, and politicians; excluding those who died violent deaths), and estimated that those 
born before 100 BCE enjoyed a median lifespan of 72 years; those born after 100 BCE had an esti-
mated median lifespan of 66 years.4 Skipping forward a millennium or so, Maria Carrieri and Diego Ser-
raino turned their attention to popes and artists between the 13th and 19th centuries. Between 1200 
and 1599, the median lifespan of a pope was 66 years and 63 for an artist. Lifespans then increased: be-
tween 1600 and 1900, it was 77 years for a pope and 70 for an artist.5 Today, the average British resi-
dent lives considerably longer than all these privileged men. According to 2004-2016 figures from the 
UK Office of National Statistics, a newborn boy can expect to live 79.2 years while a newborn girl can 
expect to live 82.9. Among those who survive to age 65 years, men can expect to live a little over 83 
years and women can expect to live to 86 years. C. D. Mathers et al.’s recent multi-country study found 
that this increase in lifespan among older adults is happening across high income countries—usually 
due to improvements in healthcare and healthy behaviours—but not low income countries.6 Longevity 
may no longer just be for popes and philosophers, but it is still not equitably distributed.  
 Now for a more trivial example; this time one of human anatomical change. Between the 1870s 
and the 1970s, the average height of Western European adults increased by an average of 1cm per dec-
ade according to data from 15 countries.7 This too is a global trend: for example, South Korean women 
gained 20.2cm and Iranian men gained 16.5cm between 1896 and 1996.8 Again, these gains are unlikely 
to be due to genetic changes so much as to changes in sanitation and diet.9 Like changes in lifespan, 
these increases in height have not been linear: average adult height has fluctuated over time. For exam-
ple, the English got taller under Roman occupation between the 3rd and 5th centuries BCE, and then 
shorter again from the 7th century, and then taller again after the Norman Conquest, and then shorter 
again in the 1200s and 1300s when there were great famines, and then taller again after the Black 
Death, and then shorter again during the harsh working conditions of the Industrial Revolution.10 You 
get the picture. 
   
Moral unease over biotechnological human enhancement 
And you get the point. Human cognitive ability, lifespan, and physiology have all changed over time: 
and if higher IQ scores, longer lives, and taller builds are improvements, then what we have experi-
enced is enhancement. Indeed, even if the distinction between therapeutic treatment and enhancement 
could be sensibly made, it is implausible to consider the increase of IQ scores, adult lifespan, or height 
to be examples of the former. We may be cleverer than our grandparents, but this does not entail that 
they suffered from cognitive deficits. We may live longer now than they did, but this does not entail 
that they died prematurely. We may be taller now than they were, but this does not entail that they were 
physically disabled. So, if we find these changes acceptable, then there can be no objection to human 
enhancement per se.  
Furthermore, these changes are attributable to human activities and accomplishments: improve-
ments in education and cognitive stimulation, and in sanitation and diet and healthcare. In other words, 
these were technology-driven enhancements. So, again, if we find them acceptable, there can be no gen-
eral objection to technology-driven enhancement. Nor is it plausible to object to deliberate attempts at hu-
man enhancement, while permitting in accidental enhancements. The population changes I described 
above may well have been happy accidents of various social and economic changes, but we now do reg-
ularly try to improve ourselves and each other via means not unlike those mentioned above, including 
improvements in diet, cognitive environment enrichment, education, and sanitation. Unless those too 
are morally problematic, then we have no silver bullet against the use of technology to enhance our lon-
gevity, cognitive ability, and physiological adaptedness. 
So far, so obvious: but then, how we might distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable 
forms of technology-driven enhancement? Well, if it is neither the enhancement nor the technological that is 
the problem, perhaps it is the bio- aspect of biotechnological enhancement that raises moral alarm 
bells. ’Twas ever thus. Moral queasiness about biomedical intervention is hardly new. Consider the his-
torical and current uneasiness over contraceptive and fertility treatments11, and ergogenic and nootropic 
substances, and even vaccines.12 There are obvious differences between these interventions and the 
means of enhancement discussed in the previous section: medical and more specifically biotechnologi-
cal techniques involve direct manipulations of human bodies and brains. Relatedly, they are directly tar-
geted at individuals now and not society at large over generations.  
Recent psychological research might shed some light on why these bother us, both the direct 
and the biological aspects of biotechnological intervention. Work on the Trolley Problem, for example, 
has shown that people find the direct infliction of harm (viz., pushing someone onto railway tracks to 
be hit by a train) less morally acceptable than the indirect infliction of harm (viz., redirecting a train to 
hit someone) even if the consequence of both actions leads to the same positive outcomes (viz., saving 
the lives of five people whom the train would otherwise have killed).13 Stock criticisms of research on 
the Trolley Problem aside, the general idea that we are more averse to causing harm than allowing it 
should be uncontroversial. Indeed, this is how many theologians and philosophers of religion let God 
get away with the suffering we see (or ignore) around us. Biomedical—and more specifically, modern 
biotechnological—interventions are not paradigmatic cases of harm, but they are perceived as direct 
intrusions into the body envelope, and ex hypothesi close enough to be psychologically governed by our 
normative intuitions about harm.  
From another theoretical angle—that of Moral Foundations Theory14—attempts at body modi-
fication are likely to trigger feelings of disgust associated with violations of purity or sanctity, which are 
in turn emphasized especially by religious people: our opposition to biotechnological interventions may 
therefore be the psychological result of weighting our concerns about purity over our concerns about 
the potential positive health benefits of such interventions (plausibly covered under MFT’s care/harm 
domain).15 Of course, to explain our moral intuitions in terms of our affective responses is not to repu-
diate them: indeed, some philosophers have argued that our reactions of disgust or repugnance are 
good moral guides.16 However, arguments from repugnance generally assume the universality of the 
disgust response toward the behavior in question: this assumption fails to enjoy empirical support. 
Therefore, unless proponents of these arguments are willing to supplement them with claims that their 
opponents are affectively or morally defective, the arguments will prove unsound on the basis of false 
premises even if they can be made to be formally valid.17 
There is a further sociological observation that may be offered, which comes closer to the cen-
tral concern of this paper. As a culture, we have become enamoured with the gene as a unit of analysis.: 
this gene-centrism manifests itself not only in debates within evolutionary theory over the units of se-
lection, but also in political and otherwise political debates about such diverse topics as pathology, eth-
nicity, gender, and sexuality. In particular, there is widespread equivocation between the “genetic” and 
the “natural” or even the “real”. Thus, for a disease like attention deficit and hyperactivity disorder to 
be real requires it to have a genetic basis; and for homosexual orientation to be natural, it needs to be 
genetically caused; and distinctions between subpopulations of human beings are based on genetic dif-
ferences. This privileging of the gene—and its alignment with the natural—also gives it moral purchase, 
such that genetic modifications are seen as morally problematic on the grounds that they are modifica-
tions to our nature. But even setting aside issues concerning the alignment of the natural with the good, 
there are many problems with this way of thinking about genes.  
Phrases like “genetic basis” and “genetically caused” are often uncritically bandied about, but 
they do not hold up to scrutiny. It is a truism that all human attributes are genetically based, in the uni-
versally accepted sense that all biological attributes are products of gene-environment interactions: even 
the most stubborn of genetic determinists admit both “nature” (note the equivocation again) and “nur-
ture” in their causal vocabulary. The upshot of this is that traits cannot be categorized between those 
that have “genetic bases” and those that do not. The obvious next step is to try to plot traits on a con-
tinuum of naturalness based on the “genetic contributions” to their development. This will not do ei-
ther, as direct inferences from analyses of variance to conclusions about causation are invalid: biological 
causality cannot be apportioned in the way that, for example, physical causality might be18. The statisti-
cal technique is simply inappropriate for this metaphysical job. But if the specialness of genes lies not in 
the quantity of their causal contributions, perhaps it lies in certain qualitative differences between ge-
netic and other developmental resources. However, close comparisons of genes against other develop-
mental factors—epigenetic as well as physical and cultural environmental variables—reveal that posited 
asymmetries are theoretical choices rather than empirical findings: if genes are considered “signal” (or 
“blueprint”, to use a more common metaphor) against environmental “noise” (or “building material”), 
it is not because the facts of biological development and evolution make them so19.  
Now, well-informed readers might notice that the claims in this section are debatable: they are 
accepted by developmental systems theorists and by those sympathetic to the recent extended evolu-
tionary synthesis, but disputed by others more closely aligned with the 20th century version of the mod-
ern evolutionary synthesis. Guilty as charged, but this only goes to reveal the perils of delegating meta-
physical questions—in this case, questions about centrality of genetics to philosophies of human na-
ture—to biologists. To be sure, it is of academic interest to elucidate the theological and ethical ramifi-
cations of contested or even falsified biological theories, but we should at least know that that is what 
we are doing.  
 
Appeals to nature 
Neo-Darwinism is often said to have rung the death knells of Aristotelian essentialistic teleology, but 
there are vestiges left of the old metaphysics in our moral thinking, both religious and secular. Talk of 
“playing God” is bandied around at least as flippantly and uncritically as talk about genes, but for reli-
gious and nonreligious people alike, the objection seems to have something to do the violation of hu-
man nature.20 Of course, it is the tradition of natural law reasoning that formally and rigorously defends 
this link between the nature of a thing and its goodness. The basic metaphysical presupposition of nat-
ural law reasoning is that things have natures that are given (by God, if we want to get theological) and 
are therefore prior to us as individuals. A thing’s nature determines its proper end, the direction to-
wards which is what it means to be good. Natural law theories therefore fly in the face of the post-En-
lightenment concern to cleave facts from values, and the concomitant ban from deriving an “ought” 
from an “is”. Then again, so do naturalistic consequentialist theories, in their moves from pleasure to 
goodness, pain to badness, or whatever. In any case, this presupposition provides a general method for 
assessing the moral valence of actions: actions are morally good insofar as they contribute to the fulfill-
ment and flourishing of humans qua humans, and morally bad insofar as they pervert or damage our 
humanity. 
 The devil is, of course, in the details. Just as utilitarians face difficulties in justifying their views 
on what counts as the utility to be maximized, so natural law theorists face difficulties in justifying their 
view on which aspects of human nature count among those to be protected and promoted. In other 
words, before they can enumerate biotechnological oughts, natural law theorists need an account of 
what human nature is. As it happens, religious natural law theorists pride themselves in their naturalism, 
even while insisting that “the very idea of natural law demands ontological support of the kind pro-
vided by theism”21: the upshot of this naturalism is that, quite unlike the divine command theorist, the 
natural law theorist is confident in his or her ability to discern the natures of things and reason about 
them to make moral inferences. This confidence is, in my judgement, misplaced.  
We have already considered the empirical and conceptual difficulties with equating the natural 
with the genetic: and even if we had good reasons for giving genes the requisite metaphysical weight to 
make them morally relevant, and even if we knew how to apportion causality to specific genes relative 
to other developmental resources, we would be left with the task of determining which genetic poly-
morphisms were normative and which were aberrant. One option is to conflate the normative with the 
normal, but natural law theorists are generally quick to resist this tyranny of the statistical average, and 
for good reason: the goal of any individual life is not to be at the centre of the normal distribution of 
any given trait. Another option is to bring in the resources of evolutionary theorizing, and to consider 
normative the traits (and underlying genes) that have been selected for: but this move too has been re-
sisted, as there might be many evolutionarily adaptive traits—sexual promiscuity, proneness to violent 
aggression, distrust of outgroup members, to list a few possibilities—that natural law theorists tend not 
to want to embrace.  
 There is a further, thornier problem. Before we can determine the traits that are natural to hu-
mans, such that attempting to modify them is a violation of human nature, we need some account of 
what a human is, whose nature it is we are investigating. There seem to be two strategies taken: to dele-
gate the definitional responsibility to biologists and accept that humans beings are whatever Homo sapi-
ens are, or to assert that natures are self-evident and that “we recognize it when we see it”, even if we 
cannot list necessary and sufficient criteria.22 To tackle the second strategy first: it is not at all obvious 
that membership in the category “human being” is self-evident. Our deplorable history of slavery and 
genocide makes that point resoundingly well. Less melodramatically and as conservative natural law 
theorists can sympathize with, our current debates over abortion, stem cell research, and treatment de-
cisions for patients in permanent vegetative states all show that questions about what (or who) counts 
as a human being are not straightforwardly and uncontroversially answered.  
Nor is it obvious that we should delegate our definitional—and metaphysical—work to biolo-
gists. The desire to do so seems to be predicated on a misunderstanding of how scientific taxonomies 
work. Consider, for example, the fact that we have multiple definitions of “life” and “death”, each of 
which are fit for the purposes they serve whether it is the delimiting of a field of scientific enquiry or 
the choice of treatment options. For some purposes, life begins at fertilization; for others, at embryonic 
implantation; for others, at birth. For some purposes, life ends when the heart stops; for others, when 
breathing does; for others still, when brain functions cease. Questions about when life really begins and 
ends are poorly posed when posed to the biomedical scientist: the correct answers depends on the con-
text of the question.23 Similarly, there is no biological answer to the question of how to distinguish be-
tween the sexes, or even how many sexes there are. There are plausible multiple criteria that are not 
perfectly correlated with one another, including chromosomal, internal sex organs, external sex organs, 
hormonal levels, and hormonal reception (e.g., androgen sensitivity). For some purposes, it is reasona-
ble to say that there are two sexes; for other purposes, it is reasonable to say that there are more; for 
still other purposes, it is reasonable to say that sex lies on a biological spectrum.24  
What is true of life and death and sex is true also of species. There are multiple definitions of 
species—that is, multiple systems of biological taxonomy—some of which apply better to some taxa 
than others and for some purposes than others. Morphological species concepts rely on similarities and 
differences in form; biological species concepts rely on interbreeding and reproductive isolation; phylo-
genetic species concepts rely on evolutionary divergence. Each species concept has its benefits and lim-
itations that are more or less salient in different contexts of scientific application; none are designed for 
theological and moral reflection. Species concepts are tools constructed for biological research; the as-
sumption that they are fit for purpose for religious and moral use cannot be taken for granted. Indeed, 
taxonomical pluralism presents a significant challenge to natural law theorists insofar as they expect bi-
ology to help them distinguish between natural kinds. Consider, for example, a moral objection against 
genetic hybridization based on the idea that we ought not act to violate species boundaries. This objec-
tion assumes that there are objective species boundaries, such that there can be a fact about the matter 
of whether we have crossed them. But if there are such objective boundaries, they are not given to us 
by biological science, whose taxonomical concepts are theory-driven constructions.25 If natural law the-
orists want to have objective boundaries between species so as to forbid interventions that inter-mingle 
them, they have some metaphysical work to do.  
 
The challenges ahead 
Biology does not supply on a silver platter an answer to questions such as “What is a human being?” or 
“What is human nature?” The best that the biological sciences can do is provide a variety of options for 
our perusal.26 The rest is up to us. We must decide upon our metaphysical commitments and infer from 
them our moral norms. But we seem reticent to do the job. And no wonder, for it is a difficult job. It is 
a job made both more difficult and more pressing by biotechnological advances and goals. Even if it 
were obvious to us how to draw lines between humans and nonhumans now, this task will be increas-
ingly difficult when—for example—we modify nonhuman animals to be more like us or to be able to 
interbreed with us. Perhaps we could object to such activities on the grounds that it will make our phil-
osophical tasks more difficult, but this is unlikely to be persuasive. Besides, even if we just oppose all 
biotechnological activities that problematize species membership further, it is important to recognize 
that such technologies are not responsible for our conceptual confusion in the first place.  
 We have fared much better at constructing normative accounts of human nature than we have 
been as defining and describing it, if by that we mean that there are plenty of available options. Natural 
law theorists among theists have catalogues of basic goods ready at hand, which they infer from what 
they identify as natural human desires and inclinations. Both of these strategies and the goods they 
identify owe themselves largely, unsurprisingly, to Thomas Aquinas.27 Protestant theologians have been 
less ready to align themselves with neo-Aristotelianism, but they too are prone to turning to nature, ask-
ing questions not only about universal human traits but also uniquely human traits: the intuition here, 
hardly foreign to neo-Aristotelians, is that both the universal and the unique are good indicators of hu-
man nature.28 This general method relies on the careful study of human desires and inclinations, as well 
as of the factors that encourage or diminish human flourishing. In so doing, it suggests a potentially 
fruitful relationship between theology and the human sciences, whose goal is precisely to conduct such 
studies.  
 This relationship is not to be one-sided, of course. Being as affected by its Zeitgeist as any other 
disciplines, the preoccupations and methods of the social and psychological sciences are what you might 
expect in late capitalism in the individualistic West. The theoretical assumptions and methodological tools 
of these sciences are therefore ripe for theological critique. Are, for example, current measures like gross 
domestic product or the Happiness Index29 or the Satisfaction with Life Scale30 fit for the purpose of 
answering our questions about the conditions of human flourishing? Are the basic human needs posited 
by Abraham Maslow and psychologists ever since a reflection of their own projected desires, or accurate 
descriptions of human beings in general? Should we adopt the assumed goals of political, economic, and 
evolutionary processes—power, wealth, reproductive success—as the goals given to our human nature 
by God? But if theological critique of the social and psychological sciences is possible, this must mean 
that natural law theorizing has its own theoretical and methodological assumptions for the human sci-
ences. Now, it will not do just to complain after scientists and popularizers of science come up with 
narratives of human nature that seem to us too reductive or mechanistic or crass or amoral. They—we, if 
I may speak from the laboratory bench here at the end—need theologians and philosophers to help us 
ask the right questions if there is to be any hope for useful interaction between the sciences and their 
queen. The ritual of philosophical and theologizing about scientific discoveries from our armchairs has 
proved inefficacious: if there is to be any hope of fruitful interaction between theology and the natural 
and social sciences, collaboration has to begin earlier than the publication and (worse still) popular dis-
semination stage. I am aware that these demands seem unfair on theologians: not only am I suggesting 
that theologians should do theological metaphysics and ethics, but I am expecting them to help scientists 
do science. And it is unfair, I suppose, but whoever said that this was meant to be easy?   
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